Recently, on January 24, 2023, in the case G. Babu v. The District Collector and Ors. The Court noted that the National Trust for Welfare of Persons with Autism, Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation, and Multiple Disabilities Act, 1999, defines "person suffering from multiple disabilities" as "a person with benchmark disability" as defined in Section 2(r) of the 2016 Act. The Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court on Tuesday allowed the brother of a schizophrenic patient to be appointed as her legal guardian.

Further, the court stated that this would allow the Local Level Committee established under Central 44 of 1999 to handle issues of guardianship appointments for people with any form of disability.

The Local Level Committee established under Central 44 of 1999 should deal with cases of other disabilities as well, according to Justice G. R. Swaminathan, as it would make access to justice simpler and faster. He specifically mentioned cases of congenital conditions like autism, cerebral palsy, and mental retardation.

In Section 2(j) of the 1999 Act, the phrase "person suffering from many disabilities" must be understood to mean "a person with a benchmark disability," as that term is defined in Section 2(r) of the 2016 Act. By using this strategy, the Local Level Committee would be able to handle guardianship matters for people with any form of handicap. The instances of congenital disorders, including autism, cerebral palsy, and mental retardation, should not be the only focus of the Local Level Committee established by Central 44 of 1999. They must address other disabilities. The new 2016 RPwD Act should be taken into consideration while applying the 1999 Act, not the outlawed 1995 Act. This is especially true because the 1999 Act makes it simpler to obtain guardianship appointments. It might not always be able to approach the High Court and obtain orders quickly. A guardian could be appointed if the Local Level Committee under the 1999 Act has that authority, which would undoubtedly make it simpler and faster to access the legal system.

The Regional Medical Board has certified that the sister of the petitioner, who received a 60% on the IDEAS Scale, is unable to support herself financially and is reliant on her family members for care of her daily needs. The jurisdictional Tahsildar has certified that she is a spinster, that she is mentally ill, and that she is in the petitioner's care. The District Differently Abled Welfare Officer of Madurai has also provided a certificate along similar lines. But the petitioner's plea to have him named as her legal guardian was denied, with the justification that Act 44 of 1999 has no provision for the appointment of a legal guardian for someone who is mentally ill.

The Court noted that individuals with autism, cerebral palsy, and mental retardation are not the only ones covered by the institutional framework established by Central Act 44 of 1999.

The authorities reportedly believe that the 1999 Act does not apply to acquired disabilities. This perception is untrue. This is so that people who have multiple disabilities are covered by the second portion of the definitional clause in Section 2(j) of the 1999 Act. As previously mentioned, the definition included in Section 2(i) of the 1995 Act will be reached by using this definitionThis is so that people who have multiple disabilities are covered by the second portion of the definitional clause in Section 2(j) of the 1999 Act. As previously mentioned, the definition included in Section 2(i) of the 1995 Act will be reached by using this definition. The first five classifications listed in the definition can either be inherited or acquired later in life. None of the aforementioned criteria, individually or even collectively, would necessarily call for the appointment of a guardian. The eighth category in the definition mentions mental disease. Therefore, in my opinion, the 1999 Act should not exclude mental illness from its purview.

As for whether Section 2(i) of the 1995 Act finds a place in Central Act 44 of 1999 by way of reference or by way of incorporation, the Court also stated that while dealing with beneficial legislation, the Court's approach must be to accept the present that would empower the targeted categories.

The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act of 2016 refers to "benchmark disability," which refers to a person with at least 40% of a specified disability when it has not been defined in terms of measurement, in contrast to the 1999 Act, which defined "severe disability" as a disability with eighty percent or more of one or more of multiple disabilities. There is no reference to "serious disability" in the 2016 Act. The court cited the ruling of the Supreme Court in Vikash Kumar v. UPSC.

The 2016 Act has been referred to as a paradigm shift from the 1995 Act's stigmatising medical model of disability to a social model of disability. In accordance with the 2016 RPwD Act, 21 specific disabilities are now recognized, and other categories of disability may be added by the Central Government. As a result, I interpret Central Act 44 of 1999's statutory framework in relation to and in light of Central Act 49 of 2016. Although Section 2(h) refers to a combination of two or more disabilities as described in Section 2(i) of the 1995 Act, the court pursuing the provisions of Section 2(j) of the 1999 Act noted that the first five categories therein do not actually call for the appointment of a guardian. The 1999 Act, on the other hand, deals with the sixth category, which is mental retardation.

From that perspective, it is unnecessary to require that the first five categories be integrated with the condition of mental disease. This is due to the fact that mental illness is the only reason guardianship is necessary. To clarify, the requirements listed in the first five categories may not necessarily necessitate the appointment of a guardian, either individually or in combination. The Court noted that the phrase "combination of two or more disabilities" must be adequately and purposefully defined.
 

The Court noted that "a person with baseline disability," as defined under Section 2(r) of the 2016 Act, must be understood to mean "a person suffering from numerous disabilities," as stated in Section 2(j) of the 1999 Act. Because doing so would make it possible for the Local Level Committee established under Central 44 of 1999 to handle situations involving the appointment of guardians for people with any form of impairment.

The Court noted that the petitioner's sister has a 60% disability based on the circumstances, and the materials in the file show that she has benchmark disability.Although the definition in the 1999 Act stated that a person would only fall into the "severe" category if they had a disability that was more than 80% of their normal capacity, the Court noted that a case had been made for appointing a guardian because the concept of "severe disability" had been dropped in the 2016 Act.
 
As a result, the court revoked the contested order and ordered that the petitioner be named his sister's guardian.

Author: Swetha Gunasekaran  Advocate